International Affairs is Britain's leading journal of international relations. Founded by and edited at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, it has not only developed a much valued insight into European policy debates but has also become renowned for its coverage of global policy issues. It provides a stimulating and international mix of authors and draws on the best of both English-language and foreign-language debates. Articles, all fully refereed, are commissioned from a wide range of authoritative and interesting writers who have something new and original to say about topics that matter. In addition, International Affairs has an extensive book reviews section, containing up to 100 reviews each quarter, written by experts in the field. JSTOR provides a digital archive of the print version of International Affairs. The electronic version of International Affairs is available at http://www.interscience.wiley.com. Authorized users may be able to access the full text articles at this site.

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International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) © 1997 Royal Institute of International Affairs
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