We examine the persistence of cropland retirements induced by the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest U.S. conservation program. We analyze micro data on observed land-use choices following CRP contract expiration over 1995—1997 and predict that 42% of CRP acres would not have been returned to crops within a year if the program had expired in 1997. These results indicate that temporary cropland retirement payments under CRP generate land-use changes that often extend beyond contract periods. The analysis suggests that targeted signing bonuses for first-time enrollees would increase the longer-term impacts of CRP and perhaps other incentive-based land-use programs.
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Land Economics
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