This paper explores the perennial objection to passibilism (conceived as susceptibility to or capacity for emotion) that an omnipotent being could not experience emotions because emotions are essentially passive and outside the subject's control. Examining this claim through the lens of some recent philosophy of emotion, I highlight some of the ways in which emotions can be chosen and cultivated, suggesting that emotions are not incompatible with divine omnipotence. Having concluded that divine omnipotence does not exclude emotional experience in general, I go on to address an objection to the idea that God experiences the emotions involved in suffering in particular, suggesting one possible way of arguing that God's suffering is chosen while also maintaining the authenticity of divine suffering.
Religious Studies is an international journal devoted to the problems of the philosophy of religion as they arise out of classical and contemporary discussions and from varied religious traditions. More than twenty-five articles are published each year, and the journal also contains an extensive book review section. All articles are peer-reviewed by a renowned international board of scholars to ensure that the articles are of the highest quality.
Cambridge University Press (www.cambridge.org) is the publishing division of the University of Cambridge, one of the world’s leading research institutions and winner of 81 Nobel Prizes. Cambridge University Press is committed by its charter to disseminate knowledge as widely as possible across the globe. It publishes over 2,500 books a year for distribution in more than 200 countries. Cambridge Journals publishes over 250 peer-reviewed academic journals across a wide range of subject areas, in print and online. Many of these journals are the leading academic publications in their fields and together they form one of the most valuable and comprehensive bodies of research available today. For more information, visit http://journals.cambridge.org.
This item is part of a JSTOR Collection.
For terms and use, please refer to our
Religious Studies
© 2009 Cambridge University Press