Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Self-Selection by Contractual Choice and the Theory of Sharecropping

William Hallagan
The Bell Journal of Economics
Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn, 1978), pp. 344-354
Published by: RAND Corporation
DOI: 10.2307/3003586
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003586
Page Count: 11
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($24.00)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Self-Selection by Contractual Choice and the Theory of Sharecropping
Preview not available

Abstract

There are definite patterns for the organization of production on agricultural land. Production of some crops tends to be organized via wage contracts, while land sown to other crops tends to be rented, and still other crops are most frequently sharecropped. One popular explanation is that contractual choice in agriculture is related to the riskiness of production. Sharecropping, according to this argument, is used with the most risky crops to facilitate risk spreading in a world with incomplete insurance markets. Empirical studies have, however, reported results which conflict with the risk-spreading story. This paper combines the arguments developed in the recent screening literature with empirical results from the sharecropping literature to offer an explanation of the observed use of wage, share, and rent contracts which does not rely on assumptions concerning the relative preferences toward risk bearing by landowners and tenants.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
344
    344
  • Thumbnail: Page 
345
    345
  • Thumbnail: Page 
346
    346
  • Thumbnail: Page 
347
    347
  • Thumbnail: Page 
348
    348
  • Thumbnail: Page 
349
    349
  • Thumbnail: Page 
350
    350
  • Thumbnail: Page 
351
    351
  • Thumbnail: Page 
352
    352
  • Thumbnail: Page 
353
    353
  • Thumbnail: Page 
354
    354