Realists assume that individuals are obsessed with relative gains and that cooperation is the exception rather than the norm in international relations. In contrast, liberal institutionalists assume that, in many situations, individuals are motivated by absolute gains. These critical assumptions are examined. Results show that the salience of relative gains varies with the beliefs of the individual, the nature of the opponent, and the context of the situation, and that individuals often employ alternative pure strategies (e.g., equity) or mixed strategies (e.g., relative gains in the domain of gains and absolute gains in the domain of losses). Decision strategies (e.g., relative gains, absolute gains, joint gains, equality, and altruism) are linked to the growing constructivist literature in international relations.
The Journal of Conflict Resolution is an interdisciplinary journal of social scientific research and theory on human conflict. The journal focuses largely on international conflict, but also explores a variety of national, intergroup and interpersonal conflicts.
Sara Miller McCune founded SAGE Publishing in 1965 to support the dissemination of usable knowledge and educate a global community. SAGE is a leading international provider of innovative, high-quality content publishing more than 900 journals and over 800 new books each year, spanning a wide range of subject areas. A growing selection of library products includes archives, data, case studies and video. SAGE remains majority owned by our founder and after her lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures the company’s continued independence. Principal offices are located in Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC and Melbourne. www.sagepublishing.com
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