Losers have not drawn much attention in political science; the focus is almost entirely on the winners. This is certainly true in the study of partisan realignment, where analysis has centered mainly on explaining the emergence of a new majority party. But to what extent do the machinations of the fallen majority party contribute to securing the political status of the new majority? This article examines that question by exploring what happened to the Republicans in the 1930s. The author argues that the GOP response to the New Deal lies in the perceptions (or misperceptions) of Republican elites and the effects that rapid policy transformation can have on interest groups within party coalitions.
Current issues are available on the Chicago Journals website: Read the latest issue. Polity is the journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association, published quarterly since 1968. As a general-interest journal, it has always sought to publish work of interest to a broad range of political scientists — work that is lively, provocative, and readable. Polity is devoted to the premise that political knowledge advances through scholarly communication across subdiscipline boundaries.
Since its origins in 1890 as one of the three main divisions of the University of Chicago, The University of Chicago Press has embraced as its mission the obligation to disseminate scholarship of the highest standard and to publish serious works that promote education, foster public understanding, and enrich cultural life. Today, the Journals Division publishes more than 70 journals and hardcover serials, in a wide range of academic disciplines, including the social sciences, the humanities, education, the biological and medical sciences, and the physical sciences.
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