The campaign in North Africa in 1942-43 was an essential step on the road to the creation of an effective tactical air support doctrine for the U.S. Army and U.S. Army Air Forces in the Second World War. American theory prior to the campaign was found lacking in a number of areas, especially when exposed to the crucible of battle. The ineffectiveness of Allied units in North Africa, both air and ground, American and British, led to a reorganization in early 1943. For the tactical air forces, the key to the reorganization was the adoption of the British Eighth Army-Western Desert Air Force model of ground-air cooperation which had proven successful in combat.
The Journal of Military History is published quarterly by the Society for Military History, an organization of about 2000 historians and persons with a scholarly interest in military history. The organization (formerly the American Military Institute) was established in 1937, and has published a quarterly journal under various titles since that date. The Journal--published in January, April, July, and October-- includes scholarly articles and book reviews on topics in military history from all chronological periods and geographical areas. Note: The Journal of Military History has undergone several name changes. It began publication in 1937 as The Journal of the American Military History Foundation, and became The Journal of the American Military Institute in 1939. In 1941 the title was changed to Military Affairs, and in 1989 it became The Journal of Military History.
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The Journal of Military History