This article attempts to provide a historically accurate description of attrition as an operational strategy. The Korean and Vietnam Wars contain prominent and commonly recognized examples of attrition. These examples clash with the popular image of attrition as a futile and bloody slogging match in which a commander ruthlessly trades the lives of his men in order to weaken the enemy at a relatively favorable rate. In these conflicts, attrition was a basic process of warfare, characterized by a variety of methods. Although not necessarily optimal, it was a useful alternative to other operational strategies that were too costly or risky. Accordingly, the popular image of attrition-shared by many historians, political scientists, and military officers-may not reflect the actual history of attrition.
The Journal of Military History is published quarterly by the Society for Military History, an organization of about 2000 historians and persons with a scholarly interest in military history. The organization (formerly the American Military Institute) was established in 1937, and has published a quarterly journal under various titles since that date. The Journal--published in January, April, July, and October-- includes scholarly articles and book reviews on topics in military history from all chronological periods and geographical areas. Note: The Journal of Military History has undergone several name changes. It began publication in 1937 as The Journal of the American Military History Foundation, and became The Journal of the American Military Institute in 1939. In 1941 the title was changed to Military Affairs, and in 1989 it became The Journal of Military History.
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The Journal of Military History