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Rationality as Conditional Expected Utility Maximization
Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Economy and Political Psychology (Mar., 1995), pp. 63-80
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791450
Page Count: 18
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Rational choice theory, Expected utility, Voting, Psychology, Signals, Political science, Rationality, Desire, Political candidates, Conditional probabilities
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Rationality is usually defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This paper argues for defining it in terms of conditional expected utility maximization by showing this conception's superior explanatory power in the case of electoral participation and the honoring of political commitments. The paper also shows that the expected utility definition relies on a somewhat outdated metaphysics of choice and free will whereas conditional expected utility maximization's view of decision-making is more in keeping with standard scientific assumptions about human agency and behavior.
Political Psychology © 1995 International Society of Political Psychology