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Journal Article

Modesty without Illusion

Jason Brennan
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 75, No. 1 (Jul., 2007), pp. 111-128
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40041093
Page Count: 18

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Topics: Modesty, Virtue, Virtuosos, Moral judgment, Saliency, Emotional stability, Perfection, Boasting
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Modesty without Illusion
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Abstract

The common image of the fully virtuous person is of someone with perfect self-command and self-perception, who always makes correct evaluations. However, modesty appears to be a real virtue, and it seems contradictory for someone to believe that she is modest. Accordingly, traditional defenders of phronesis (the view that virtue involves practical wisdom) deny that modesty is a virtue, while defenders of modesty such as Julia Driver deny that phronesis is required for virtue. I offer a new theory of modesty--the two standards account--under which phronesis and modesty are reconciled. Additionally, since the two standards account involves reflection on moral ideals, I provide an account of the proper nature of moral ideals. "Self-command is not only itself a great virtue, but from it all other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre."--Adam Smith