Legislative redistricting in the states is highly contentious due, at least in part, to its partisan implications. But does the method by which states draw legislative districts affect partisan competition in the elections that are held in these districts? We examine the effects of three methods used by states to draw district boundaries on competition in congressional elections. Specifically, we evaluate the effects on competition of legislative, judicial, and commission redistricting plans enacted prior to the 1992 and 2002 congressional elections. We find that more competitive elections occur when courts and commissions are directly involved in the redistricting process, as opposed to when redistricting is handled only in the state legislative process.
State Politics & Policy Quarterly (SPPQ), peer-reviewed and published quarterly, is the premier publication outlet for original research on state politics and policy. The official publication of the State Politics and Policy Section of the American Political Science Association, SPPQ publishes high quality academic studies that develop and test general hypotheses of political behavior and policymaking, exploiting the unique advantages of the states.
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