The literature on CEO compensation is quite rich and varied given a very long research tradition. However, since most of these efforts have focused on countries such as the US and UK. Precious little is known about the determinants of CEO compensation in countries outside the developed western world. In attempting to fill this gap, this study, set in India, examines whether factors such as the spread of family controlled conglomerates and governmental involvement in private business have an impact on the way in which top executives are compensated. It provides the first evidence of the important role of family and government ownership in corporate governance and CEO compensation. The findings offer an useful point of reference against which results from western studies could be compared so as to develop a more holistic theory of CEO pay.
MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL REVIEW is a double-blind refereed journal that aims at the advancement and dissemination of applied research in the fields of International Management. The scope of the journal comprises International Business, Cross-cultural Management, and Comparative Management. The journal publishes research that builds or extends International Management Theory so that it can contribute to International Management Practice.
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