Since the rise of players' unions helped equalize the bargaining power between players and team owners in professional sports, sports leagues have struggled to find economic regulatory systems that satisfy both sides. Many mechanisms have been employed; the most recent such device is the "luxury tax." Current versions of the luxury tax-utilized by Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association (NBA)-require that teams with aggregate player salary expenditures above a specified level are assessed a tax. This Note focuses primarily on the robust taxation system employed by the NBA because it is likely to be used as a viable model for other leagues. When examining the NBA taxation model, however, it becomes apparent that it has serious imperfections and, in fact, works against its stated goals. This Note uncovers the various consequences of the NBA luxury tax and offers some solutions to its structural flaws.
Founded in 1901, the Columbia Law Review is a leader in legal scholarship in the United States and around the world. The Review is an independent nonprofit corporation edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. Published eight times a year, the Review is the third most widely distributed and cited law review in the country, receiving close to 1,500 submissions yearly from which approximately 25 manuscripts are chosen for publication.
The Columbia Law Review is one of the world’s leading publications of legal scholarship. Founded in 1901, the Review is an independent nonprofit corporation that produces a law journal edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School.
This item is part of a JSTOR Collection.
For terms and use, please refer to our Terms and Conditions
Columbia Law Review
© 2004 Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.
Request Permissions