Wedding vows seem to be promises. So they go: "I promise to love, honour, and cherish ...." But this poses a problem. Divorce is not widely seen as a serious moral wrong, but breaking a promise is. I first consider, and defend against preliminary objections, a 'hard-line' response: divorce is indeed prima facie impermissible promise-breaking. I next consider the 'hardship' response—the hardship of failed marriages overrides the prima facie duty to keep promises. However, this would release promisors in far too many cases. I resolve the triad by considering the content of the vows. Vows concerning love are not promises at all. We cannot promise to do acts the performance of which is outside our control, and love involves states of mind outside our control. Vows concerning spousal roles are complicated by diverse social understandings of marriage and the centrality of emotion to the roles.
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice