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Political Research Quarterly
Journal Article

Buying Policy? The Effects of Lobbyists' Resources on Their Policy Success

Amy McKay
Political Research Quarterly
Vol. 65, No. 4 (DECEMBER 2012), pp. 908-923
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41759323
Page Count: 16

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Topics: Lobbying, Assets, Political action committees, Political research, Datasets, Political candidates, Corporations, Congressional legislation
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Buying Policy? The Effects of Lobbyists' Resources on Their Policy Success
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Abstract

This study tests the common assumption that wealthier interest groups have an advantage in policymaking by considering the lobbyist's experience, connections, and lobbying intensity as well as the organization's resources. Combining newly gathered information about lobbyists' resources and policy outcomes with the largest survey of lobbyists ever conducted, I find surprisingly little relationship between organizations' financial resources and their policy success—but greater money is linked to certain lobbying tactics and traits, and some of these are linked to greater policy success.
Political Research Quarterly © 2012 University of Utah