This article questions, and in some contexts disproves, the validity of the efficiency justifications for the comparative negligence rule. One argument in the literature suggests that comparative negligence is the superior rule in the presence of court errors. The analysis here shows the analytical flaw in this claim and conducts numerical simulations — a form of synthetic "empirical" tests — that prove the potential superiority of other rules. The second argument in the literature in favor of the comparative negligence rule is based on its alleged superior ability to deal with private information. This article develops a general approach to liability rules as mechanisms that induce selfselection among actors. It then shows that self-selection can occur, not only under comparative negligence, but also under every other negligence rule. These conclusions weaken the efficiency explanation for the growing appeal of the "division-of-liability" principle within tort law and beyond.
The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers. The Review is a refereed journal, published twice a year. It maintains the highest scholarly standards, and at the same time endeavours to publish international work that is accessible to the full range of membership in the ALEA, which includes practising lawyers, consulting economics and academic lawyers, and academic economists from around the world. The Review differs from other journals in the field in that it features book reviews and review essays. It also differs from other scholarly economic journals in particular, in that the Editors endeavour to make the material more easily accessible to non-academics.
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