The main focus of this review is on international trade and foreign direct investment when the institutions that provide the security of property rights and enforcement of contracts are imperfect. Some issues of national security related to poor governance of international transactions are also considered. The discussion organizes a selective overview of the literature and offers some suggestions for future research.
The Annual Review of Economics covers significant developments in the field of economics, including macroeconomics and money; microeconomics, including economic psychology; international economics; public finance; health economics; education; economic growth and technological change; economic development; social economics, including culture, institutions, social interaction, and networks; game theory, political economy, and social choice; and more.
Annual Reviews was founded in 1932 as a nonprofit scientific publisher to help scientists cope with the ever-increasing volume of scientific research. Comprehensive, authoritative, and critical reviews written by the world's leading scientists are now published in twenty-six disciplines in the biological, physical, and social sciences. According to the "Impact Factor" rankings of the Institute for Scientific Information's Science Citation Index, each Annual Review ranks at or near the top of its respective subject category. A searchable title and author database and a collection of abstracts may be found at https://www.annualreviews.org//. The web site also provides information and pricing for all printed volumes, online publications, and reprint collections.
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Annual Review of Economics
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